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Abstract 
 
In recent years, the concern about environmental problems and increasing environmental 
regulation represents a challenge for profit-maximizing firms. There are suggested 
approaches toward a so-called win-win situation where both industry and environment can 
benefit. According to ‘Porter Hypothesis’, environmental regulation can act as a trigger to 
shoot the target. In the way that, more stringent regulation system will be imposed on a firm, 
more a firm will be motivated to innovate. The environmental innovation has been divided in 
two categories: Treatment innovation and Prevention innovation. From the Porter school 
point of view those firms, which invest in environmental prevention technology, will enjoy 
innovation offset. Innovation offset can exceed the compliance cost and firms can increase 
their benefit.  
 
In this thesis, this idea that prevention innovation is more profitable than treatment 
innovation has been investigated. The analysis is based upon Statistic Norway and 
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority database, which includes observation from 
approximately 4323 firms in five industrial sections over four years. In general, the empirical 
finding of this thesis does not support the idea. On the contrary, there is a strong support for 
profitability of treatment innovation.      
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Financial performance and Environmental performance can go hand in hand. Eco-
efficiency is the key to sustainability, in both economic and ecological terms. The key to 
eco-efficiency is innovation and productivity improvement.”   
Alex Krauer, cited in Bernauer, et al.(2006) 
 
In recent years, the concern about environmental problems and increasing environmental 
regulation represents a challenge for profit-maximizing firms. Many avenues as the 
options for reducing generation of pollutants have been nominated, such as substitution 
among inputs, add-on purification, recirculation of residuals, re-localization of activities, 
and  above all change of production technology. Production technology can be improved 
by reduction in material inputs, changing in types of inputs or reusing the residual. It 
seems that production technology is the most relevant option with the profit 
maximization of firm.  
 
Krauer’s statement is one of the countless suggested approaches toward a so-called win-
win situation where both industry and environment can benefit. At the first stage, many 
researches have done attempts to find out basically, if there is any relationship between 
environmental and financial performance of firm1. Does a company that strives to attain 
good environmental performance gain advantages over competitors or it is just an extra 
cost for the firm? Going to the next step, another group of researches have investigated a 
more specific question: under regulation, how can firm garb opportunities to get more 
benefit or reduce its costs regarding environmental performance? The later question has 
been appeared from the ‘Porter’s Hypothesis’, which simply is “… properly designed 
environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially or more than offset the 
cost of complying with them” (Porter and Van Der Linde, p.98, 1995). Nominating 
innovation as an important stimulant in firm competitiveness plan is not a new topic in 
                                                 
1 See, e.g. Cohen et al. 1995, Hamilton 1995, Hart & Ahuja 1996; Klassen & McLaughlin 1996, Telle 
2006, etc. 
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economics literature. Many studies have questioned this relationship under different 
conditions broadly. In the next chapter, I will look at this relationship more in detail.  
 
Under the assumption of existence of a positive relationship between innovation and 
competitiveness, does it hold also for environmental innovation? The most pushing factor 
for green innovation from the Porter’s school point of view is the environmental 
regulation: more stringent regulation system will be imposed on a firm; more a firm will 
be motivated to innovate. The environmental innovation has been divided in two 
categories: Treatment innovation and Prevention innovation2. The first one refers to an 
attempt to reduce the existing pollutant/ not-green products (end-of-pipe), while the other 
appoints the basic solutions to prevent producing pollution/not-green products 
(integrated). Porter asserts that within properly designed environmental standards the 
second one generates offsets which can partially/or more than fully covers the cost of 
complying with regulations. Considering these notions, this thesis has a look toward both 
innovation types and is an attempt to answer the following question: 
 
 ‘Does the prevention pollution investment provide more innovation offsets 
compared to the treatment pollution investment?’ 
 
To my best knowledge, the question has not been addressed in literature directly. 
However, following the seminal work of Porter and Van Der Linde (accounting a link 
from regulation to promoting innovation which leads to the offsets occurrence), two 
strands of literature should be reviewed in investigation of different types of 
environmental innovations effects on financial performance of a firm. The relationship 
between innovation and financial performance of a firm, and the relationship between 
environmental innovation and environmental regulation are two required sets of studies, 
which will be explored in the chapter two, the literature review. Third chapter discusses 
the theoretical approach, which includes social cost and innovation, the definition of 
prevention and treatment innovation, a very simple economical model and finally 
                                                 
2 These two terms will be discussed comprehensively in the body of thesis. Also see Hass, p, 3-5, 2004.  
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defining proper measures. In chapter four, the empirical approach will be defined, the 
database, applied variables, econometrics model of hypothesis, and the regression model. 
In chapter five, I will discuss the regression result and the last but not the least is chapter 
six which discusses conclusion and opens the new problems for further researches. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The economic application of a new idea or so-called innovation is the performance and 
growth through improvements in efficiency, productivity, quality, competitive 
positioning, market share, etc. Typically, innovation adds value; however, it can be 
considered as a destructive or negative-effect factor in a way that it clears away or 
changes old custom technologies that imposes cost to the firms. Moreover, it seems the 
risky and costly features of innovation do not persuade firms to invest in developing their 
technology eagerly. Nevertheless, due to dynamic character of market structure, 
innovation is an inevitable phenomenon at present. If a firm intends to remain in the 
market, it has to go along with new technologies. The firm can either carry out innovation 
procedure internally or adapt/copy it from the original innovator. In this chapter, I will 
review some literatures that have studied the relationship between financial performance 
of a firm and innovation in general (R&D), and- focusing more on the object- those 
which have studied the relationship between financial performance of a firm and green 
innovation. I should mention here the question of this thesis is not tracing a relationship 
between the green innovation and financial performance of a firm generally. Rather, it 
emphasizes on different green innovations (prevention and treatment) effects on financial 
performance of a firm. To my knowledge the problem has not been addressed directly in 
literature; however, reviewing these two strands of literature can shed lit on the 
theoretical discussion and imply the concept of green innovation relation with financial 
performance of a firm.    
2.1. The Relationship between Innovation and Financial Performance of a Firm  
Nås and Leppälahti (1997) in Innovation, Firm Profitability and Growth, have explored 
relationships between innovative activity, profitability, and firm growth in Norwegian 
industry. They argue that innovation is not costless, since it is followed by an increase in 
the production cost. Accordingly, the innovator firm is not necessarily more profitable, 
but likely the more survival and growing. Their second argument states that innovation is 
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the temporary monopoly power, which the firm gains at the time of offering new 
product/process to the market. The firms can either increase the price of superior product, 
which improves returns on sales/assets or hold price down resulting an increase in sales 
and market shares. “In this case profitability […] may not improve via innovation, but 
innovation will improve the growth performance of the firm.” (Nås and Leppälahti, p.9, 
1997) Their study is based on a dataset including information from the Norwegian 
Innovation Survey and accounting data for a panel of industrial firms for the period 1990-
1994. They have investigated that two applied measures of profitability (operating profits 
and return on total assets) are highly correlated, in a way that both measures have shown 
more or less the same pattern in most of the analysis. They have found innovating firms 
in Norway have higher rates of growth of sale. However, the research does not support a 
strong link between innovation and profitability in terms of return on sales or assets. As 
long as they have not controlled the study with factors like firm size, industry, innovating 
strategy and innovative inputs, their findings show no major differences between 
innovator and follower, product and process innovators. Their answer to the question if it 
pays off to be innovative ‘is not an unambiguous “yes”’. They argue that the answer 
“depend[s] upon who you are; what business you are in and what you are trying to 
accomplish.” (Nås and Leppälahti, p.61, 1997) 
In a dynamic world, where constantly changes occur in technology, timing is a hard task 
for a firm. In other words, a firm is faced with the investment time challenge 
continuously. Mukherji et al. (2006) in their article investigate the importance role of 
time in making decision for an investment in new technology or upgrading product in IT 
industry. They argue that choosing the suitable time for applying innovation is a 
significant factor in firm success. Investing in new product/process is both costly and 
risky; however, waiting too long can deprive the firm from enjoying the competitiveness 
in the market. On the other hand, continuous improving, under the assumption of 
feasibility, is not an optimal tactic where the adoption costs will be significant. They pose 
“investments in upgrades are best made when the gap between new technology and 
current technology reaches a critical threshold. Among other factors, this threshold is 
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influenced by technology cost, change management cost and opportunity cost.” 
(Mukherji et al., p.1692, 2006)  
Market pioneering is nominated as a shiny path toward a higher level of competitiveness 
which is followed by an economically reward for the firm. The linkage between market 
pioneering and financial performance of a firm has been investigated and much of the 
studies has yielded inconsistent results. Covin et al. (1999) account the difference in the 
result is due to ‘when and how’ the firm gains pioneering. According to theory and past 
research, they pose market pioneering is an environment phenomenon. It can be awarded 
in one environment, while same action of pioneers does not receive reward/ encourage in 
another environment. Moreover, “firm performance is affected by the fit between a firm’s 
pioneer/follower status and its competitive tactics.” (Covin et al., p. 175, 1999) They 
mention two kinds of environment: benign and hostile. In a benign environment, factors 
associated with product superiority and distribution channel decision are related to firm 
growth for pioneers and followers. While in a hostile environment, factors associated 
with product price, product costs, product line breadth, and market breadth are related to 
firm growth among pioneers and followers. (Covin et al., p. 203, 1999) They argue that 
these two environments require their own tactic to approach; otherwise being pioneer by 
itself does not lead to a higher level of economical success. 
Kim and Park (2006) in their article cite birthright as another key factor in firm’s success 
regarding innovation. They have investigated “how a firm's birthright can determine its 
competitive advantage and its ability to survive an industry shakeout, especially when 
caused by non-disruptive technological innovations. Birthright is defined as the firm's 
superior endowment of resources, both tangible and intangible, vis-à-vis competitors', 
stemming either from its earlier entry into the market or from prior experience in a related 
market.” (Kim and Park, p, 543, 2006) In their case study, they have investigated Korean 
mobile telecom industry and their findings support the claim that a firm with greater 
birthright (reputation or brand) enjoys consolidation in the market regardless of 
newcomers, which offer innovative products.  
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Therefore, innovation does not lead directly to a higher profitability level by itself. A firm 
can improve its economical success by implying innovation, but it has to consider many 
other factors such as industry, size of its firm, elasticity of market, timing, the tactic 
between pioneer and follower, and the birthright that are strongly involved.             
2.2. Environmental regulation, Green Innovation and Financial Performance 
The second strand of literature has looked at how the regulations affect the incentives to 
innovate and whether these innovations induce profits for the firms or not. Latest in this 
regard is Lanoie et al. (2007) which provides new insights on the Porter Hypothesis. In 
their study, the significance of three distinct variants of the Porter Hypothesis defined by 
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) has been tested using data on the four main elements of the 
hypothesized causality chain (environmental policy, R&D, environmental performance 
and commercial performance). These three distinct variants of Porter Hypothesis (quoted 
from Jaffe and Palmer, 1997) are weak, narrow, and strong version respectively. The 
‘weak’ version of hypothesis “is that environmental regulation will stimulate certain 
kinds of environmental innovations, although there is no claim that the direction or rate of 
this increased innovation is socially beneficial. The ‘narrow’ version of the hypothesis 
asserts that flexible environmental policy instruments such as pollution charges or 
tradable permits give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations 
such as technology-based standards. Finally the ‘strong’ version posits that properly 
designed regulation may induce innovation that more than compensate for the cost of 
compliance.” (Lanoie et al., p. 3, 2007) For testing the significant of all three 
aforementioned versions, they have used a database collected by the OECD, which 
includes observation from ca. 4200 facilities in seven countries.3  
 
Their estimation has been conjectured to a strong support for ‘weak’ version, qualified 
support for ‘narrow’ version and qualified support for ‘strong’ version of the hypothesis. 
They argue that result for the ‘weak’ version is reassuring the positive relationship 
between environmental policy and innovation. In fact, it is a logical consequence of 
                                                 
3 See Lanoie, et al., 2007 for more details. 
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increased policy stringency since “environmental policy changes the relative price of 
environmental factors of production.” (Lanoie et al., p. 31, 2007) With respect to the 
‘narrow’ version, their finding is a support to the claim that flexible performance 
standards are more inducing for innovation than prescriptive technology-based standards. 
However, for the market-based instrument this support is no longer valid. Finally, there is 
‘some indirect support’ for the ‘strong’ version. While, according to their finding the 
negative “direct effect of environmental policy stringency on business performance is 
greater in size than indirect positive effect mediated through R&D, [which] may mean 
that a large part of the investments necessary to comply with regulation represent 
additional production costs, such as through investment in end-up-pipe abatement.” 
(Lanoie et al., p. 32, 2007) 
 
Bernauer et al. (2006) account, “environmental innovations encompass all innovations 
that have a beneficial effect on the environment regardless of whether this effect was the 
main objective of innovation.” (Bernauer et al., p.3, 2006) They elaborate their discussion 
by focusing on explanations of product and process innovations as follows: 
 
“Organizational innovations do not reduce environmental impacts directly, but 
facilitate the implementation of technical (process and product) environmental 
innovation in companies. Process innovations are defined as improvements in 
production process resulting in reduced environmental impacts, e.g., closed loops 
for solvents, material recycling, or filters.” (Bernauer et al., p. 3, 2006)      
With some adjustment in terms, prevention innovation and treatment innovation are 
equivalences for organizational innovation and process innovation respectively. Following 
the applied terms in the thesis, I will continue to appoint the prevention and treatment 
innovation. 
 
Bernauer et al. argue that to investigate the relationship between environmental policy and 
innovation, one should distinguish between prevention and treatment innovation which 
most of the studies have failed to do so. Moreover, market structure and firm internal 
factors are two fields that have to be considered in this regard. They account the influence 
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of market concentration on environmental innovation carries ambiguous evidence in 
literature. Empirical studies have not supported an abundant focus on the environmental 
improved products followed by customer benefits or providing credible information on 
their green quality as the determinate of innovation. Hence regarding market structure, 
‘competitiveness’ and ‘customer demand’ should be considered as two important 
determinates. Counting firm internal factors, the authors claim, green capabilities, R&D 
intensity, and firm size are the most important factors, which their effects on innovation 
goals, should be focused. 
 
While these two strands of literature have investigated important aspects of objective 
relationship and shed some lights on the innovation effect on financial performance, they 
do not address the issue of ‘what type of investments’ a firm should roll in. In other 
words, this thesis is an attempt to fulfill some of the mentioned suggestions in the studies 
for the future research, such as taking to account the difference between the treatment and 
prevention innovation, firm size, the environment of the innovation, etc.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Approach 
According to Fagerberg et al., “invention is the first occurrence of an idea for a new 
product or process, while innovation is the first attempt to carry it out into practice.” 
(Fagerberg et al. 2005) In turning an invention to innovation, a firm requires investment 
to transform the new idea to the practical stage; otherwise, it will remain at the concept 
level. In other words, the investment is the casual factor to make the abstract invention to 
the concrete innovation. Therefore, investment concept is embodied in the definition of 
innovation. It is not very plausible that Porter Hypothesis refers to the different 
inventions rather than innovations. Hence, in this thesis when I discuss firm attempt in 
different innovation types for pollution protection technologies, simultaneously I mean 
the different technological investments, which a firm makes.  
 
As I discussed it in the previous chapters, investment or carrying out innovation into 
practice is both risky and costly. Before focusing on the main problem that investigates 
the effect of different types of investments (prevention and treatment) on financial 
performance of a firm, one should examine the necessity of innovation. In this chapter, I 
briefly discuss the concept of social cost and its components, individual cost and 
unwanted cost, and explain how innovation can be a remedy to minimize the unwanted 
cost. The prevention and treatment innovation definitions will come afterward, then I 
define a very simple economical model, which represent the relationship between 
financial performance and investments, controlling by environmental performance. Due 
to the significant role of environmental performance, which will be explain further, the 
chapter goes on by discussing the relationship between financial and environmental 
performance of a firm. Finally, defining the proper measures for the aforementioned 
variables concludes the chapter. 
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3.1. Social Cost and Innovation 
It is logical and acceptable that a firm target is profit maximizing, avoiding any extra cost 
and environmental performance, or being green, in deed has cost at least in the short run. 
However, there are always two sides to every story. If the firm wants to skip this cost, it 
will be imposed on someone else, or in a better word, the society. In general those firms 
that their productions come up with producing emission, impose part of social cost 4to the 
society. Let us see what social cost is. Consider an example: The private cost to a motorist 
of driving between Oslo and Bergen is the cost of petrol and oil and wear and the tear on 
his car. However, the other people have to put up with the externalities of the journey, for 
instance the noise, smell, pollution and traffic congestion the motorist helps to cause along 
his way. If I added on to private cost an amount of money to compensate for the 
inconvenience caused, the over all figure will be the social cost of journey. 
 
Private cost                 + Externalities                 = Social cost 
(Cost to individual)      + (Unwanted Cost)       = (Cost to everyone) 
 
In my discussion, I am interested in the second part of this sum, unwanted cost. The cost 
of emission may be different from case to case. It can be a reduction in an individual’s 
utility, destruction of natural resources, and depletion of species of an animal or in a 
crucial case putting in danger the health of human beings. In most of the cases, let us say 
in all, the exact measuring of social cost is not possible. For solving this, we can just have 
an estimation of its measures. The purpose of environmental regulation is to correct for 
negative externalities that increase the social cost.  
 
In neo-classical economics, environmental regulation is viewed as “a means to force 
firms to internalize external costs they would otherwise impose on society.” (Bernauer et 
al., p. 4, 2006) A firm that produces emission or has a weak environment performance 
imposes cost to the society and it is not green. If the firm wants to be green, it should 
                                                 
4 I am guided here by Pigou who is responsible for the distinction between private and social marginal 
products and costs. He originated the idea that governments can, via a mixture of taxes and subsidies, 
correct such market failures — or internalize the externalities. 
(Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Cecil_Pigou, Accessed, 23 Sep, 2007) 
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reduce its emission until bottom line so that in the ideal form the emission will be zero5. 
Nevertheless, until providing that utopian condition, one should endure the unwanted 
cost. With the lack of ‘firm greenness’, all the costs will be transferred to the society 
(individuals, planets, animals, nature, etc.). That is what was happening in most of the 
industrial sectors before the environmental regulation contract will be signed. The cost 
can be divided to each side of the parties, producer, and consumer. For the consumer, it 
can be either paying higher price for the firm’s good products or tolerating the 
consequence of legally emitted pollution. For the producer, its share is the payment for 
economic incentives such as pollution fees, marketable permits, and liability. In our 
discussion, the focus is on those kinds of firms, which follow the imposed regulation and 
they endure some costs for being green.  
 
The point of this thesis is neither offering optimal solution for the minimum cost 
considering both sides, nor chasing a robust positive relationship between environmental 
and financial performance of a firm as it has been already studied vastly. Rather, this 
thesis investigates a suggested solution to minimize ‘firm share’ from the unwanted cost.  
 
Porter accounts that the firm’s share from this unwanted cost is more that what it should 
be. From the ‘Porter School’ point of view, the relationship between the financial and 
environmental performance of a firm holds a negative one as far as firm’s optimization 
framework is considered static and no opportunity for innovations will be assumed. 
While in reality, a firm is surrounded by “dynamic competition which is characterized by 
changing technological opportunities.” (Porter et al., p.99, 1995) It can be put in another 
form. If we assume that the unwanted cost is imposed on all firms, then the question will 
be how a firm can have superior productivity in compare to its rivals. Porter suggests that 
under regulation, firm will be smarter about the approaches toward emission reduction 
and eliminating the costly process/ product. In this way, there is decrease in its both cost 
and emission. 
 
                                                 
5It may raise this claim that from economical point of view, the zero level is not an ideal situation; though, 
in some situations having a level of emission is more idealistic. But, the study is pointing out to the 
technical aspect rather than its economical one.     
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Narrowing down the discussion, the benefit-chain of firm can be presented as follows: 
When a stringent regulation will be imposed on a firm, it acts as a spur to innovation and 
due to the character of market; there are countless avenues for technological 
improvements. These improvements coupled by innovation offsets, increase the financial 
success of a firm or decrease its share from the unwanted cost. 
3.2. Prevention and Treatment Innovations  
Porter et al. argue, “Companies must start to recognize the environment as a competitive 
opportunity- not as an annoying cost or a postponable threat.” (Porter et al., p.114, 1995) 
It is time for companies to get benefit of the regulation rather than finding ways to avoid 
it or fight for more pollution quota or other illogical solutions which may lax their 
regulation, but nothing positive can be achieved in a long term.  
 
Mainly Porter et al. suggest a well-crafted environmental regulation can ‘act as a spur to 
innovation’ that situates the firm in a win-win opportunity, and under the regulation 
“Innovation offset” is the key factor of persuasion for the firms. They discuss, 
“Competitiveness at the industry level arises from superior productivity, either in terms of 
lower costs than rivals or the ability to offer products with superior value that justifies a 
premium price. […] internationally competitive companies are not those with the 
cheapest inputs or the large scale, but those with the capacity to improve and innovate 
continually.” (Porter et al., p. 97-98, 1995) In their article, Porter et al. pose the 
competitive advantages enjoy neither from static efficiency, nor from optimizing within 
the fixed constraints. Rather the competitive advantages gain imputes from the capacity 
for innovation and improvement that shifts the constraint. They continue that within 
properly designed environmental standards the stimulated innovation can partially/or 
more than fully offset the cost of complying with them. Hence innovation is a shiny path 
toward the minimizing the environmental protection cost which a firm has to deal with. 
 
Porter et al. expand their discussion and in the first from six serving purposes of a 
properly crafted environmental regulation, they define two kinds of innovations, which 
under regulation firms try to invest in. One form of innovation “reduces the cost of 
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compliance with pollution control, but changes nothing else,” where the other one 
“addresses environmental impact while simultaneously improving the affected product 
itself and/or related processes.” (Porter et al., p. 101, 1995) In this thesis, guided by 
definitions from Statistic Norway (SSB) I appoint these two innovations treatment 
innovation and prevention innovation respectively. (Hass, p. 3-5, 2004) Following is the 
definition of these two kinds of investments by SSB.  
 
Investments in pollution treatment are also called investments in “end-of-pipe equipment” 
or known as “process external” equipment. These are defined as “capital expenditures for 
methods, technologies, processes, or equipment designed to collect and remove pollution 
and pollutants (e.g. air emissions, effluents or solid waste) from the environment after 
their creation, prevent the spread of and measure the level of the pollution, and treat and 
dispose of pollutants generated by the operating activity of the company. Pollution 
treatment includes investments in equipment (e.g. filters or separate cleaning steps) which 
compose or extract pollutants within the production line, when the removal of this 
equipment would not affect the functioning of the production line.” (Hass, p. 4, 2004) 
 
Investments in pollution prevention are also called investments in “integrated 
technologies” or known as process internal equipment. These are described as “capital 
expenditures for new or adaptation of existing methods, technologies, processes, 
equipments (or parts thereof) designed to reduce or eliminate the creation of pollution, or 
change the composition of pollutants (e.g. toxicity), at the source, thereby reducing the 
environmental impacts associated with the release of pollutants and/or with polluting 
activities”. (Hass, p. 4, 2004)  
 
Porter et al. pose that the second form of the innovations (prevention innovation) is the 
central for their claim that ‘environmental regulations increase industrial 
competitiveness’ followed by a higher level of firm’s success. Briefly, they argue those 
firms, which invest in prevention technologies, get more benefit from the market. Getting 
more benefit can occur when the firm is pioneered in the technology, and can sell the new 
technology or its patent to the other firms. Introducing new prevention technologies can 
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avoid the occurrence of particular episodes of pollution. Some large companies have 
almost gone bankrupt over particular episodes; moreover, in a case of an accident in may 
lead to a national catastrophe such as Union Carbide in the case of Bhopal6, India in 
1984. Marketing will be more effective when one can market “basic-green” labeled 
products and process7. This thesis is an attempt to compare the profit of those firms, 
which have invested in prevention technologies and those in treatment technologies. 
 
Here I would like to expand the concept of pioneering in innovation which has been 
addressed in literature review briefly. A firm can enjoy the new technology in two ways: 
One way is investing in an innovation and carry it out to practice; in this case, the firm is 
pioneer/innovator. Although the investment imposes a relatively high cost to the firm, the 
innovator firm can enjoy selling the patent or keep the technology protected and get 
prosperity from market due to its privileged new product/ process. Smart innovator firm 
is aware of rapid stream of new-come innovations, so the firm infers that this pioneering 
prerogative does not last too long. Hence, the innovator should export the technology to 
the other firms in the market, but not the knowledge/ information support and make a 
benefit by providing support services for the non-innovator/followers firms.  
 
The other way for enjoying an innovation is to adopt/copy it from the innovator firm. In 
this case, the non-innovator/follower firm does not require enduring the investment cost 
and can save its arrows for the best hunting. In other words, the follower firm is deprived 
from the pioneer firm’s advantages (rights, patent, and so on.); however, it will get the 
completed, qualified, and standard product without spending its both time and relatively 
high fiscal resource on that. Many studies have investigated the profitability of these two 
                                                 
6 The chemical accident was caused by the introduction of water into methyl isocyanides holding tank 
E610, due to slip-blind water isolation plates being excluded from an adjacent tank's maintenance 
procedure. The resulting reaction generated a major increase in the temperature of liquid inside the tank (to 
over 200°C). The MIC (Methyl isocyanides) then gave off a large volume of toxic gas, forcing the 
emergency release of pressure. A Union Carbide subsidiary pesticide plant released 40 tones of MIC gas, 
immediately killing nearly 3,000 people and ultimately causing at least 15,000 to 22,000 total deaths. 
Bhopal is frequently cited as the world's worst industrial disaster.  
(Wikipedia, "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal_disaster", Accessed, 17 July, 2007 )  
7 Not being green, make some firms unable to gain access to certain markets when the environmental 
standards are low, e.g. certification mechanism (such as ISO 14000). Many large multinationals companies 
require ISO 14000 certification of subcontractors, for these to deliver inputs to these firms. One example is 
pulp and paper industry in Germany. 
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kinds of firms (innovator and non-innovator). For example, Nås and Leppälahti (1997) in 
their study have found no significant differences in profitability between innovators and 
non-innovators for Norwegian industry as a whole. However, when they control for some 
factors such as firm size, and industry section they have different results. (See Nås and 
Leppälahti, p. 63-65, 1997) Similar to what I have discussed regarding persuading firm to 
be green, I emphasize that this thesis is not an attempt to persuading firm to innovate. 
Rather, its object is to compare the profitability of those pioneer/ innovator firms, which 
invest in different types of innovations: prevention and treatment.  
 
As discussed earlier, the innovation offsets resulting from prevention innovation, Porter 
et al. suggest, can exceed the cost of compliance. Investments in prevention technology 
can offer two kinds of offsets: Product offsets and Process offsets. As the authors account 
these two offsets are related, so that achieving one of them can be followed by the 
realization of the other. These two offsets occur when, in addition to reducing the 
emission, the products enjoy a “better-performing/higher-quality, more safety, lower 
product costs,” etc. and the process enjoys “higher resource productivity such as better 
utilization of by-products, lower energy consumption, material saving”, etc. (Porter et al., 
p.101, 1995) In this thesis, I consider these two offset together as the total offsets of 
prevention innovation investments and comparing them with the offsets of treatment 
innovation is the object problem.  
3.3. The Economic model 
In this section, I want to investigate the relationship between the financial performance of 
a firm and different types of investment in innovation. Here I simply present a model:    
 
π = f (IPP, IPT, Z) 
 
Whereπ , IPP, and IPT are profit of firm, Investment in Pollution Prevention and 
Investment in Pollution Treatment technology respectively. Z is the vector of control 
variables. 
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It is assumed that profit is a function of innovations. In this model, there is no time-
subscript due to the different time relationship between the components of this model. In 
this section, I discuss the model without time-index interfering and in section 3.4.4. 
(Time lag), I explore time relationship in detail.    
 
The purpose of this thesis is to find out whether there is any relationship between the 
investments and profit. In case of existing a positive relationship between them, which of 
them (IPP or IPT) has a higher share in profit increase. Z is the vector of control 
variables, here environmental performance. It is clear the goal of these kinds of 
investments is to reduce the emission or improving the environmental performances 
while increasing profit/ reducing cost. Identifying the relationship between the 
aforementioned investments and profit of a firm requires analysis of the relationship 
between the environmental performances and financial performances of a firm. 
 
I argue that omitting the improvement in the environmental performances of a firm may 
lead the study to a non-valid result. Not considering the environmental progress 
operations, investment in pollution protection may cause an increase in the profit of a 
firm; however, this change in profit can appear due to many other different factors, which 
greenness of the firm may have no role in. For example, an increase in price of outputs in 
a period, while having investment in environmental performance, may lead to a higher 
rate in profit. Although an increase in profit will be achieved, it is not owed to a better 
environmentally performance, and possibly no change has been occurred in the level of 
pollution and the firm acts as before. 
 
Avoiding the problem of omitting relevant factors, I strongly suggest that in studying the 
relationship between the pollution protection investments and the financial performance 
of a firm, the environmental performance of a firm should be considered. If the 
investments will not come up to a reduction in the level of pollution or does not provide 
an insight toward the approach of doing that, the investments is a cost which firm has 
been endured in vain. 
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3.4. Defining proper measures  
A proper measure of success for both financial and environmental performance of a firm 
will not be achieved easily. Estimating innovation does not seem a very easy task to do. 
Presenting a well-defined measure theoretically which covers all aspects, does not mean 
the measure will be supported empirically. Shortage of data, inaccuracy in firms report 
regarding their performances, appearing new phases in industry and many other factors 
can be called as excuses for inability to come up with an acceptable measure. Yet the 
following sections offer estimation to measure the innovation concept in addition to a list 
of both performances measure, which have been applied in previous researches: Financial 
performance and Environmental performance. 
 
3.4.1. Innovation Measure 
How best to measure a new idea/procedure has been a crucial task for the business 
section over the years. Creating an accepted metric system for measuring creativity in 
order to compare its benefit with its cost is still an inconclusive concept in the literature. 
These are the problems, which have been counted for measuring innovation, but they 
actually pointed out to invention not innovation. Although these two words are used 
interchangeably and connected, as I discussed earlier, they are not the same. Innovation is 
the concrete extension of invention. Apparently measuring an abstract concept 
(invention) is a very hard job to accomplish, but the goal is to measure the innovation that 
is ‘the invested invention’. Hence, in this thesis ‘investment’ is the measure of 
innovation.   
 
One may claim that the better way to evaluate the innovation is to consider its both sides: 
cost and benefits. I argue that considering innovation cost and benefit is measuring its 
profitability not itself. Although investment is the measure of innovation, the object of 
this thesis is to measure the profitability of different kinds of innovation. In doing so, 
investment can be considered as cost in one hand and the advantages which follow the 
occurrence of innovation (patent, higher market share, etc.) can be considered as benefits 
in the other hand. The net sum of these two sets represents the profitability of the 
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innovation. Theoretically this thesis has addressed the increase in the profit which is 
caused by innovation. However, in the empirical part due to the data shortage, the change 
in profit has been considered generally by all factors, which is a noticeable shortcoming 
indeed.      
 
3.4.2. Financial Measures 
Financial performance measures all efforts to optimize monetary and fiscal productivity 
of a firm. It can be measured by operating surplus of the firm or the rate of returns. Here 
is a list of some of the most common used variables as a measure of financial 
performance of a firm.  
• Total Return:  It is defined as the sum of the increasing in market value and the 
value of any dividends over a period. According to the traditional financial theory, 
the firm stock price represents the economic value of a public corporation. Thus, 
the growth in stock price indicates the growth in that value over any period. 
However, one must include the value of any dividends made to shareholders over 
the period investigated. (Cochran & Wood, p. 45, 1984) Because dividends 
represent a type of economic return and they tend to decrease the stock price, all 
else being equal.  
• Return on Investment (ROI): A common measure relates the income (before 
extraordinary items) of a firm to the value of capital invested to produce the 
income. 
            ROI= Net Income / Invested Capital 
• Return on Equity (ROE): It is a common financial measure that relates the income 
(before extraordinary items) over a period to the average total market value of the 
firm that generates those earnings. For the purpose of ROE, market value is 
common equity determined by multiplying the average number of common shares 
outstanding times their average value. 
            ROE= Net Income / Common Equity 
• Return on asset (ROA): It is another common financial measure that relates the 
income to the asset based used to generate those earnings. 
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ROA= Net Income / Average Total Assets  
• Sale Growth: It represents the rate of change (in percent) for firm sales (or 
revenues) over a period. 
• Net Income (NI) Growth: It defines a rate of change (in percent) for firm net 
income over a period. 
All mentioned measures above are the most common used in empirical work, in addition 
to other measures such as Tobin’s q (Konar & Ahuja, 1996), earning per share growth 
forecasts (Corderio & Sarkis, 1997), etc. 
     
3.4.3. Environmental Measure 
Environmental performance measures how successful a firm is in reducing and 
minimizing its impact on the environment, and encompasses all efforts to minimize the 
negative environmental impact of the firm’s products throughout their life cycle. Several 
criteria have been suggested as relevant measures for environmental performance such as 
reductions in emission data, pollution control, direct compliance expenditure, or 
environmental ranking.  
• Emission Reduction: The percentage change of firm’s emission efficiency index 
over several years. The emission efficiency index is the ratio of reported emission 
in pounds to the company’s revenues in thousand of dollars. (Applied by Hart and 
Ahjua, 1996) 
• TRI88: The aggregate pounds of toxic chemical emitted per dollar revenue of the 
firm. (Applied by Konar and Cohen, 2001) 
• LAW89: The number of environmental lawsuits pending against the firm in 1989. 
(Applied by Konar and Cohen, 2001) 
• TRI Discharges: The toxic release inventory discharges. 
  
As we can see, a very clear difference between the financial measures and environmental 
measures is that those defined financial measures can be applied in any region and any 
time, but for environmental performance any study has its own measures and each of 
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them has chosen a built-up variable which cannot be applied for the others. An ideal form 
of a measure should include: 
-All kinds of emission regardless of emission nature. 
-All victim regions: air, water, etc or even out of the earth. 
-Both stock and flow emission. 
-The sensitivity about the edge of toxic level of emission. 
-All parts of time. 
Making such measures seems impossible, but with some adjustment in, maybe a good 
one can be achieved. This thesis suggests the changes in emission as a measure for 
environmental performance, applied in the study by Hart and Ahjua. Although, it does 
not provide the amenity value of an ideal measure completely, it covers many aspects of a 
good measure.  
 
In some of the researches, market value, role of management, and firm size are 
considered as very important factors. Regarding the difference in feature of activities of 
firms, market value may varies from case to case and cannot be considered as an over 
general factor for all the firms. But, I would like to explore the two other concepts, which 
seem to have significant roles in the firm behavior studies, namely management and firm 
size.      
 
Role of management 
Not inserting the ‘role of management’ as an effective factor in performance of a firm has 
been claimed as a considerable shortcoming in many empirical studies. Obviously, the 
quality of managerial decisions can appoint firm’s level of success. One of the most 
important managerial decisions is how to allocate fiscal sources appropriately to the 
different parts of the structure of a firm. Focusing on the discussion, the role of a 
successful management can be manifest in improving “environmental performance in the 
most economical manner.” (Schaltegger and Synnestvedt, p. 5, 2001) To judge which of 
the various investments (prevention and treatment) will reward company more 
economically requires management considers various factors. Hence, the choice of 
environmental investment in prevention or treatment technology is an indicator for the 
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profound insight of the management. In this way, the role of management has been 
embodied in the study by applying these two kinds of investments.    
 
Firm size 
In some of the researches, the firm size has been considered as an important control 
variable. Disregarding firm size factor, the studies diverge from the real estimations 
regarding different performances of firm. (financial, environmental, etc.) In other words, 
considering firm size, a bigger firm can have more quotas for pollution in compare to a 
smaller one or comparing financial performance of a bigger firm with a smaller one is 
not a valid study. At the first look, it sounds reasonable; nevertheless, what is the firm 
size? What is the criterion for being small or big? There is no exact definition of firm 
size, whether it means the number of its employment or heavy machinery and equipments 
or the range of its activity and production or even its reputation in the market. Most of the 
studies have control firm size by the number of employees. However, in some researches 
the bottom line of a big firm is hundred fifty employees, while in some others studies 
having at least two hundred employees set the firm in big-firms category.8  As Tirole 
(Tirole, 1988) states, according to the various definitions of the firm9, there are various 
factors which represent the firm size. As we can see, there is no accurate definition for 
the firm size. But, what is the account for the importance of firm size?  The reason is that 
a firm behavior will be investigated/ compared with the other firms at the same 
level/group. For example the different performances of a firm like Norsk Skog should not 
be compared with a domestic firm involved in pulp and paper industry in Norway.  
 
Here I can suggest a solution to skip the firm size problem: deflating. By deflating I mean 
any required variable for the firm performance will be deflated by a relevant factor. 
Considering firm financial performance measure, I suggest the ratio of profit over capital. 
Obviously, all efforts of a firm should lead to maximizing its profit. These efforts or 
inputs can be listed as a successful management, hiring more employees, importing new 
                                                 
8 Nås and Leppälahti (1997) control firm size for fifty employees, while the threshold of a big firm has been 
considered two hundred employees in Rehfeld et al.(2006)   
9 It focuses on oligopoly firm definition. 
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technologies or heavy machinery, etc. I argue that when there is an increase in firm’s 
inputs (makes itself larger/bigger), it is expected an increase in the outputs. According to 
the definition, productivity is the amount of output (in terms of goods produced or 
services rendered) per unit of input achieved by a firm. The effect of productivity shows 
itself in the profit of a firm. The problem of firm size for financial variables can be 
amended if we consider a ratio of the profit proportional to the capital of a firm. In this 
way, the firm is conditional to its own profit and capital regardless the amount of profit or 
capital since it is their ratio. Either it is a large or small firm will not influence the study 
very strongly. The same argument can be stated for the other performances of a firm. In 
the next chapter, I will discuss my suggested normalizing factors for the other variables. 
(investments and environmental performance) One benefit of following deflating solution 
is to have more observation in samples. Classifying the firms will reduce the sample size 
and in some cases due to the lack of data, the population will be too small to investigate. 
With deflating, the sample includes all the firms which are conditional to their own 
factors.           
 
3.4.4. Time Lag 
The features of a proper measure for the variables have been discussed. Now the question 
is that ‘how their time- relationship should be.’ It is obvious there is a time difference 
between investment and getting result in the profit. Investment has an initial outlay and 
then there is a benefit stream over many years later. Apparently, if there will be an 
investment in technology (here environmental) for present period/year10, the result will 
not come up until the next year or very probably several years later. If a firm invests in 
year one, the effect of this investment requires at least one year to show up in 
environmental performance. Considering environmental protection investment, there is 
even a time difference between treatment investment and prevention investment. 
Investment in treatment technology may show result quicker than investment in 
prevention technology or vice versa. Moreover, the firm cannot enjoy financially sooner 
                                                 
10 The investment effect can be traced in different time intervals. Since a firm financial balance sheet is 
annually, I consider year as the index of period.    
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than improving its environmental performance. Looking at the relationship between 
variables, hence it faces a lag for more than two years. In other words, if a firm make an 
investment at time ‘t’, the changes in emission will be seen at time ‘t+1’ or ‘t+2’, etc. The 
firm may get benefit from that investment financially at time‘t+1’ (not very likely) 
or‘t+2’ and so on. As a result, financial performance is the most lagged variable among 
all of them.  
 
 
I argue that in doing such researches one should notice to the role of time lagging which 
influences the relationship between the aforementioned variables. A correlation table can 
serve the object. The table can present the correlation between investments, financial 
performance, and reduction of emission over various years. The highest correlated years, 
can be considered as the related- lagged years. Although it seems an efficient suggestion 
to find out the time-crossing relationship between variables, it may face difficulties in 
practice. For representing a plausible time relationship, there should be enough data over 
many years, which seems not very promising at present regarding various environmental 
investment data sets.     
 
 
 
Profit  
Increase 
Green 
Investments 
Emission 
Reduction 
First stage     Second stage    Third stage 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Approach  
Considering empirical attempts, we face diversity in results, which can be explained by 
many factors such as different data sets used, different constructed variables, and 
different samples. In the same way, differing in regulatory regime in a country, the 
industries analyzed, the considered victim environment domain (air, water, solid waste, 
odor/ noise, others), the way how to theorized the framework to evaluate this relationship, 
and many other factors can divert the results from a convergence.  
 
Lanoie et al. criticize Porter Hypothesis and assert, “[…] the evidence initially provided 
in its support is based on small number of company case studies, in which firms were 
able to reduce both their pollution emissions and their pollution costs. As such, it can 
hardly be generalized to the entire population of firms.” (Lanoie et al., p. 2, 2007) 
Apparently, it is a noticeable comment. However, running empirical researches can lead 
to a path that can come up with a generalized conclusion, which covers somehow the 
entire population of firms. Any further empirical attempt can remedy at least one 
shortcoming or look at the problem from a different angel so that shed more lit on the 
problem. The present thesis intends to do its duty in this regard and investigate the effect 
of different kinds of environmental innovations (investments) on financial performance of 
a firm empirically. Once again, I remind that this thesis deals with those firms that are 
highly regulated and have an attempt to reduce their compliance cost by means of 
investment in green innovation.  
 
In doing so, this chapter includes four sections. The first section is devoted to database 
description. The advantages and shortcomings of measures that the previous researches 
have applied in their studies have been discussed in previous chapter. However, the 
present thesis follows somehow the same rule (apply the unsatisfactory available data) 
and defines the applied variables in the second section. In section three, I describe how 
the model is structured based on accessible data. Although, by amending two suggested 
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important shortcomings of most previous studies, namely firm size and quality of 
management variable, the study seems to keep a short distance from the circle of 
shortcomings. Finally, a regression model will be presented which upon the model is 
estimated.  
4.1. Database  
The applied sample is the Norwegian industrial section where if a firm in industrial section 
is granted an emission permit, Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) puts the plant 
in one of four so-called risk classes. Being at class one, nominated the firm as a potentially 
highly environmentally dangerous, while the potentially least environmentally dangerous 
plant is placed in risk class four. Glombek and Raknerud (1997) argue that firms in risk 
classes one and two are considered highly regulated. For my purpose, the firms in classes 
one and two according to SFT classification have been considered.      
 
All the data used are from SSB (Statistics Norway) and SFT (Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority). I have constructed panels of annual firm level data for 4323 firms in five 
selected industries: manufacture of pulp, paper, and paper products, manufacture of coke, 
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, manufacture of chemical and chemical 
products, manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, manufacture of basic metals. 
The observation unit is the firm:  “A firm is defined as smallest legal unit comprising all 
economics activities engaged in by one and the same owner and corresponds in general to 
the concept of a company. […] A firm may consist of one or more establishments (plants). 
The establishment is the geographically local unit doing economic activities within an 
industry class.” (Cappelen et al., p. 39, 2007)   
 
The required datasets for this study are as follows: 
- profit index (profit and capital dataset at firm11 level, provided by SSB) 
- Air Emission dataset(SO2, NOx, and CO2, provided by SFT at firm level) 
 
                                                 
11 Foretak is the Norwegian equivalence term for firm.  
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- Investment in Pollution Prevention (integrated) and Investment in 
Pollution Treatment technology (end-up-pipe) both for climate, since the 
available emission data covers only air ( provided by SSB at plant level) 
 
For constructing variables, the following data were provided: Organization number of 
each firm (registration number), Organization number of each plants,12 Year, Profit 
(operation result13), Capital (building and construction plus other long term properties in 
current price14), Production cost, Total investment in treatment technology, Total 
investment in prevention technology, Investment in air protection (treatment), Investment 
in air protection (prevention), Annual amount of emitted CO2, SO2, and NOx for each 
firm respectively, and finally Nace code which represents the industrial section a firm is 
active in.  
 
Since the profit, capital, and air emission datasets were constructed on firm level, I 
aggregate the plants investments datasets to the firm level. In other words, having the 
same organization number, put the plants in one firm and aggregate their data under the 
firm. Organization number was the link between these three datasets. Although different 
sources for datasets (SSB and SFT) has caused difficulties in merging them according to 
the organization number, the problem was solved by getting help form ‘Register 
Authority and Source of Information.’15 In doing so, those firms that lacked the 
organization number in datasets were searched according to their name to get the related 
organization number.  
 
The data for investment in treatment technology is available from 2000, while the 
investment in prevention technology is gathered from 2002. Hence, the observation 
period is the 4-years period 2002-2005. Initially all firms in an industry that were 
operating during this period were included in the sample. A firm was excluded from the 
sample if:  
                                                 
12 Bedrifts nummer in Norwegian.  
13 Driftsresultat in Norwegian.  
14 (Bygniger og anlegg + andre varige drfitsmidler) i løpende pris in Norwegian. 
15 www.brreg.no   Accessed: 30 Dec. 2007. 
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(i) the firm has not invested on environmental protection in any year/ the 
related data is missing  
(ii) the firm emits a pollutant rather than CO2, NOx, and SO2 due to the 
lack of data 
(iii) the firm is not ranked among 1 or 2 SFT’s ranking16 
4.2. Applied Variables 
In the following section, I define and present the applied variables in this thesis. Although 
many other variables can be applied for investigating the effect of different investments 
on financial performance of a firm, the followings are the suggested variables based on 
available data. 
  
4.2.1. Applied Financial (Dependent) Variable   
The suggested variable is the ratio of profit over capital. As I discussed it earlier, in this 
way the problem of firm size will be discolored up to a great deal. The documentation of 
the capital database is carried out by Statistics Norway, which consists of data for 
tangible fixed assets for the manufacturing joint-stock companies.17  
The database contains computed values of tangible assets in current prices. The data for 
profit is the financial surplus/deficit which shows if the total revenues exceed the total 
expenditure in a firm.18  
4.1     Yit  = Profit it / Capital it  
i denotes the number of firm and t is the time index. 
 
                                                 
16According to SFT ranking A firm is categorized into one of the four classes: 
1= the potential most environmental dangerous firm, 4= Least environmental dangerous firm , 2 and 3 are 
intermediate firms. 
17For more detail, refer to Documentation of the Capital database, A database with data for tangible fixed 
assets and other economic data at the firm level, Raknerud, Rønningen, and Skjerpen, 2004. 
18SSB,http://www.ssb.no/vis/english/subjects/12/01/20/kommregnfy_en/main.html. Accessed,02 Oct, 2007. 
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4.2.2. Applied Investment (explanatory) Variables   
The explanatory variables are the different types of firm’s investments regarding their 
environmental performances. The methodology of collecting data for different green 
investments is through a survey for manufacturing industries by Statistic Norway. The 
questionnaire consists of two parts: Current cost (driftsutgifter) and Investments 
(investeringer) regarding firm environmental protection activity.19 The second part is 
divided in two sections: process external investments and process internal investments.20 
Each section gives an explanation regarding the definition of aforementioned investment.  
 
Figure 1 Example of question for investment in treatment (end-up-pipe) technologies  
 
 
English Translation: 
Has the firm made an investment in external process [treatment technology] plan or 
instrument in 2002? 
 
Figure 2 Example of question for investment in prevention (integrated) technologies 
 
 
English Translation: 
Has the firm made an investment in integrated [prevention] technology in 2002? 
 
                                                 
19 The questionnaire is given in appendix A. 
20 ‘Prosesseksterne investering’ and ‘Prosessinterne investering’ terms in Norwegian respectively.  
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In addition, in each section the firm is asked about the invested domain (receptor) 
specifically. The gathered data is according to the firms’ reports and as Hass and Smith 
pose, “The concept of environmental protection expenditure is far from being established 
as a standard accounting concept by financial accounting bodies. Norwegian enterprise 
and industry organizations are using very different approaches and definitions for their 
own use and for reporting in their annual reports and their environmental reports.” (Hass 
and Smith, p. 5, 2002) Many problems can put a question to the accuracy of data, such as:  
- the ambiguity in the distinctive line between the investment in equipments and 
investment in better off progressing in environmental performance  
- the lack of clear concept for each of the investments from firm’s point of view 
- variety of the definition of equipment for environmental protection over time   
These and many other problems can mark the data as unsatisfactory one. However, the 
measures have been done more structurally and until this year (2007), the data for four 
years (2002-2005) is provided. Due to the lack of data regarding the other kinds of 
emission, this thesis is devoted its investigation just to the air receptor/ domain in 
Norway.  
 
Air is the ocean we breathe and supplies us with oxygen. There are several main types of 
pollution and well-known effect of pollution, which are commonly discussed. These 
include smog, acid rain, the greenhouse effect, and ozone depletion. “Emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases contribute to enhancement of the greenhouse 
effect created by man. As a first step to limiting the greenhouse effect, Norway has, via 
the Kyoto Protocol, undertaken obligations for the development of greenhouse gas 
emissions.”21 According to SSB, there is a reduction in emissions of nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) in previous years. However, the emission target is still some way off. Moreover, a 
considerable part of the environmental protection expenditure in Norway has been 
amounted to air/climate. Figure three, shows that near 24 percent of environmental 
protection expenditure has been amounted to the air/climate.22  
   
                                                 
21 Statistic Norway http://www.ssb.no/klima_en Accessed: 20 Jan, 2008. 
22 Statistic Norway  http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/01/06/20/miljokostind_en/main.html  
Accessed: 20 Jan, 2008. 
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Figure 3 Environmental Protection Expenditure by domain, percent 
 
 
Hence, for constructing variables for different investments, this thesis has applied 
different kinds of investments for air/climate domain. As I explained earlier under the 
firm size section, the suggested normalizing factor here is the total investment in 
environment. Each firm’s different investment is normalized by its total investment in 
environmental protection to avoid firm size problem. Although other factors can be 
applied, for example firm’s total consumed energy for production, or the total investment. 
However due to the lack of data and confining the remarks to the relative environmental 
investments, the suggested constructed variables are shown as follows.  
 
4.2      ωij =
j
j
TEI
airt     
4.3       ηis =
s
s
TEI
airp
      
Where: 
airt:      Investments in pollution treatment for air 
airp:     Investments in pollution prevention for air 
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TEI:    Total Environmental Investment 
i  denotes number of firms  and  j and s denote time  
Since I consider the financial variable as a proportional value to the firm’s capital, these 
variables should be also divided to the total amount of environmental investment, 
otherwise it may lead us to have firm size problem seriously.       
 
4.2.3. Applied Environmental Variables   
Norwegian emissions to air of hazardous substances have been reduced considerably 
since 1995, in line with national targets and international obligations. The decline since 
1995 is mainly due to reduced emissions in the manufacturing industries, which have 
been caused by improved treatment systems and manufacturing processes as well as 
lower activity in some industries23. Focusing more on the observation sample, three 
pollutant candidates can be considered as the most bothering one in manufacturing 
industrial in Norway, namely CO2, SO2, and NOx. The present thesis has considered 
these three pollutants, which according to the SFT dataset are the most common 
pollutants among the selected manufacturing industrial sections in Norway.24  
 
This thesis has followed a similar applied approach by Hart and Ahuja (1996) for 
construction of environmental variables. The object is to trace the annually changes in 
amount of emission of toxic materials for each firm. The index of emission of various 
pollutants can be constructed as follows.25 Again to avoid the firm size problem, the 
suggested normalizing factor is production. Among several options for reducing 
generation of pollutants, reducing activity level (production) is the first one to be counted. 
As a result, I assume production and emission have a positive/direct relationship. In other 
words, more production results more pollution in case of lack of environmental protection 
in the industry. Therefore, the emission of each pollutant is normalized by production to 
                                                 
23 Statistic Norway http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/01/04/10/milgiftn_en/ Accessed: 20 Jan,2008.  
24 Since the dataset is too extensive, it is not included in the thesis as an appendix. However, it is available 
upon request.  
25 Jaggi and Freedman 1992; Wagner et al. 2002 have applied the index of emissions of various pollutants. 
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capture somehow both the internal effect (production) and external effect (environment) 
of firm activities.  
 
4.4        e piz= Emissions piz / Production iz   
 
Here p records emissions of pollutants i denotes the firm and z is the time index. e piz  is 
also known as pollution intensity which expresses the relative relationship of emitted 
emission with production. There is no doubt better candidates can be applied for 
measuring the environmental performance of a firm. Yet this thesis has come up with one 
of the suggested measures, which is compatible with the available data. 
 
Before presenting applied regression model, I would like to explain different time 
subscripts (t, j, s, and z) for variables. As I discussed in theoretical chapter, giving 
different time subscripts (t, j, s, z) to profit index, investments in pollution treatment for 
air, investments in pollution prevention for air, and emissions index is an explanation of 
different time-lagging relationship between the variables. Apparently (t > j, s, z) since the 
financial effect of investment in pollution reduction comes at the last stage. Moreover, I 
argue that it can be a time-difference effect between two kinds of investments. The 
relationship between j and s (the time subscript of two investments) can be shown as 
follows: j ≥  s. It means that the treatment technology investment may affect financial 
performance sooner than prevention technology investment or at the same year, while this 
relationship cannot be reversed. In other words, the prevention technology investment is 
the most lagged variable in this investigation due to its time-consuming features. 
Emission reduction can occur at the same year of investment in treatment technology or 
later. Obviously, emission reduction time-index should not exceed profit index time 
subscript. (z<t) As I mentioned earlier one of the best solution to find out the relationship 
between the mentioned different time subscripts is to look at the correlation table between 
them. Due to the lack of data, the presented correlation table in chapter 5 (Table 3) cannot 
be considered very significant. However, it is an attempt to show the table and discuss 
about its components and the more detail look has left for the future work.  
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4.2.4. Applied Regression Model   
For the regression of this thesis, a very simple model has been applied, under the OLS 
assumptions:      
   
(1)      itiztiztiztistijttit ueeeY ++++++= 352413210 βββηβωββ  
 
Where:  
 
Yit refers to profit index (profit over capital)  
ωij  refers to air protection investment in treatment technology at time j.   
ηis refers to air protection investment in prevention technology at time s. 
e1iz  refers to change in CO2 for firm i at time z. 
e2iz  refers to change in SO2 for firm i at time z. 
e3iz  refers to change in NOx for firm i at time z. 
uit refers to error term 
  i refers to the number of firms   
 
The concerned hypothesis of this thesis is: 
  
In other words, a firm with more intensive investment in pollution prevention technology 
benefits significantly more financially or not. I consider the restricted inequality to 
investigate the superiority of investment in pollution prevention technology. The results 
of some correlations and regressions will be discussed in the next chapter.    
H0:   if   21 ˆˆ ββ <  
H1:  if   21 ˆ ˆ ββ ≥  
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
In this chapter, I start by presenting descriptive statistic data and some correlations to 
show the approach toward picking up the related lagged variables. In the second part, I 
apply simple econometric model and discuss its results. 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations   
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables. With a short glance at the 
description, we can see the number of firms that have invested in treatment technology is 
considerably more than those which have invested in prevention technology (1471>348). 
As I have calculated, 33 percent of investment in treatment and 26 percent of investment 
in prevention has been amounted to the air/climate protection.  
 
 Table 1 Summery Statistics   
Variables Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Profit index 3872 0.55059 4.7913 -120.2679 161.02639 
Total IPT 1471 3204 14752 0 204174 
Total IPP 348 6842 36150 0 300000 
airt 1170 1367 8268 0 120000 
airp 196 3080 1105 0 118700 
ω 1169 0.3823 0.4145 0 1.000 
η 196 0.6362 0.8857 0 7.5788 
e1 3391 0.01319 0.0786 0 1.312 
e2 3383 0.0000217 0.000164 0 0.00281 
e3 3391 0.0000177 0.0001254 0 0.00263 
φit =∑
=
3
1k
ke  
3395 0.01321 0.07874 0 1.315 
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Table 2 reports the correlation between profit, total treatment investment in air (airt), and 
total prevention investment (airp). 
 
Table 2 Pearson Correlation Coefficient                                                   
 Profit Index airt Airp 
Profit Index 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Observations 
1.0000 
 
3872 
  
    
airt 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Observations 
-0.00907 
0.7629 
1108 
1.0000 
 
1170 
 
    
airp 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Observations 
-0.05185 
0.4833 
185 
0.15657 
0.1601 
82 
1.0000 
 
196 
 
 
As the result reveals, we can see a negative correlation between both types of investments 
and profit index. However, considering the related P-value’s at the level of 0.05 
significance, the correlation coefficients are not significant. (0.48> 0.05 and 0.76>0.05) 
In other words, according to the present data, we cannot interpret the correlations since 
they are not statistically significant. 
 
I recall here that airt and airp are not the applied variables in the regression, since they 
are not normalized by the total amount of environmental investment. Table 3 presents 
correlation between the applied variables in addition to the investments- lagged variables. 
As I discussed earlier the purpose of generating this table is to find out the related years 
when the variables have the highest correlation. For example, constructed variable for 
pollution treatment investment with one lag (ω-1) has the highest correlation with profit 
index in compare to ω-2 or ω and so on.     
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Table 3 Correlation Coefficient for lagged variables 
 Profit index ω ω-1 ω-2 η η-1  η-2 
Profit Index 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Obs. 
1.0000 
 
3872 
      
ω 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Obs 
-0.01619 
0.5904 
1170 
1.0000 
 
1169 
     
ω-1 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Obs 
0.14382 
0.0055 
371 
0.40380 
<.0001 
127 
1.0000 
 
396 
    
ω-2 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Obs 
-0.01675 
0.3482 
3140 
0.00576 
0.9742 
34 
0.30019 
0.0477 
44 
1.0000 
 
178 
   
η  
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Obs 
0.01319 
0.8585 
185 
-0.18056 
0.1045 
82 
-0.02683 
0.8779 
47 
-0.41032 
0.2100 
11 
1.0000 
 
196 
  
η -1 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Obs 
-0.09417 
0.2903 
128 
0.25830 
0.1076 
40 
-0.17681 
0.1843 
47 
-0.04090 
0.8805 
16 
0.41449 
0.0097 
38 
1.0000 
 
137 
 
η -2 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Obs 
-0.1670 
0.1266 
85 
0.32459 
0.2379 
15 
0.15562 
0.4783 
23 
-0.16698 
0.3096 
39 
0.43692 
0.3270 
7 
0.38806 
0.2678 
10 
1.0000 
 
93 
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According to the table, η -2 has the highest correlation with profit index and negative. One 
may expect that the highest positive correlation should be considered, but considering the 
P-value’s, indicates that none of the correlation are significant. Hence, I follow the 
mentioned earlier argument and choose one-year lag for investment in treatment 
technology and two-year lag for investment in prevention technology and no lag for 
emissions respectively.   
 
The first OLS regression on equation (1) includes following variables. Yit (profit index), 
ωi t-1(air protection investment in treatment technology with one-year lag), ηi t-2 (air 
protection investment in prevention technology with two-year lag), e1it (change in CO2), 
e2it (change in SO2), and e3it (change in NOx).  
 
In the regression calculation on equation (1), SAS software program26 revealed a trace of 
multicollinearity between the emission-related variables. (e’s) There were high standard 
deviations for each emission- related variable in addition to an insignificant value for 
both t-ratio of coefficients and the F-test. In order to detect the existence of 
mullticoleanarity, I have calculated Pearson correlation coefficient for emissions. (See 
Table 3)   
 
As we can see in Table 3, there is relatively high positive correlation between the 
emission variables. The small P- value’s indicate there is a strong evident against null 
hypothesis (H0: ρ=0) at any level, where ρ is the correlation coefficient. Since the 
calculated P-value’s are less than 0.05 level of significant, it indicates that there is a 
positive relationship between the variables. Avoiding the problem, I have merged three 
emission datasets (pooling data) after multiplying constructed variable corresponding 
CO2 emission variable in 1000. The released amount for CO2 in SFT dataset was 1000 
tons, while the others were ton.  
                                                 
26 Because of the sensitivity of data provided by SSB, I was not allowed to work with them out of SSB’s 
database. SAS is one of the common applied soft ware programs for regression in SSB.   
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The new applied variable is φit =∑
=
3
1k
kite  stands for Total Emission, which it description is 
given in the last row of Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3 Pearson Correlation Coefficient for emissions                                                   
 e1 (CO2) e2(SO2) e3 (NOx) 
 e1 (CO2) 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Observations 
1.0000 
 
3391 
  
    
e2(SO2) 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Observations 
0.36801 
<.0001 
3380 
1.0000 
 
1170 
 
    
e3 (NOx) 
Prob > |r| under H0: ρ=0 
No. of Observations 
0.74400 
<.0001 
3387 
0.49843 
<.0001 
82 
1.0000 
 
196 
 
5.2. Simple Econometrics Approach 
There is a slightly change in equation (1) and the equation will be presented as follows. 
 
(2) iztistijttitY φβηβωββ 3210 +++= +uit 
 
The OLS regression on equation (2) includes the same variable as before, just omitting 
the emission variables and including the total emission variable. At the first attempt, the 
years (2002-2005) were also included as the dummy variables. Due to the reduction in 
degree of freedom, I remove the dummy variables. However, including them could 
explain the ratio of change in profit index in terms of years. For instance if year 2005 was 
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excluded in years dummies, the coefficient of dummy variable 2004 could explain the 
change in profit index in 2004 compared to 2005. I hope that in the future works this 
matter will be considered.  
 
From ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) result in the next page, we can see the small value 
of the P-value for F-test indicates that there is a strong evident against the null hypothesis 
which is none of the explanatory variables has any effect on dependent variable.       
(0.05> 0.01) Hence, according to the result, the estimation of model is significant. 
Adjusted R-squared is the proportion of variability accounted for by the independent 
variable. (0.32) Table 4 provides the regression result in which there is surprisingly 
negative coefficient for the prevention investment (β2 = -0.69906), indicating a negative 
effect from prevention investment on profit index. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
treatment investment indicates a positive effect on profit index. (β1 = 1.0271) Clearly, 
both of the estimations (β1 and β2) are statistically significant at the significant level of 
0.05. As we can see, the finding does not support the concerned hypothesis at any level. 
( 12 ˆ  ˆ ββ f )   
 
We should notice here there is remarkable change in both estimations compared to the 
simple correlation coefficient reported in Table 3. The estimated effect for treatment 
investment has an increase (1.027 compared to 0.1438) and the estimated effect for 
prevention investment has a decrease (-0.69906 compared to -0.167). These variations 
may indicate that each of the investments is correlated with other factors that normally 
characterize the firms investment strategies. If the intercept coefficient was significant, 
we could interpret that the other influential factors reflect their effect in the intercept. 
With a P-value equal to 0.49, this estimator is far from being significant. The coefficient 
of emission variable is positive (0.61065), but considering its P-value one cannot count it 
as a significant estimation. 
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                            Analysis of Variance 
 
                                           Sum of           Mean 
Source                   DF        Squares         Square     F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                        3       10.36850        3.45617       4.44     0.0159     Root MSE                  0.88249            R-Square     0.4120 
Error                        19       14.79691        0.77878        Dependent Mean        0.01403            Adj R-Sq     0.3192 
Corrected Total        22       25.16541         Coeff Var                   6288.21800 
 
 
                       
                           
Table 4 Parameter Estimates     
 
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.20536 0.29771 0.69 0.4987 
ηi t-2 1 -0.69906 0.21118 -3.31 0.0037 
ω t-1 1 1.02718 0.51361 2.00 0.0600 
φit  1 0.61065 1.38787 0.44 0.6649 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
In general, the finding supports significant estimations for both kinds of investments. 
Although the coefficient of prevention investment reveals a negative estimation in one 
hand, the coefficient of treatment investment shows a high and positive relationship with 
profit index. As we can see from Table 3, the correlation coefficient of prevention 
investment is positive at the same year with profit index which is not very plausible. Yet, 
I have calculated the regression with no lag for the prevention coefficient which was not 
significant (insignificancy regarding F-test, t-ratio of coefficients) It may indicate that the 
negative effect of prevention investment takes longer time than applied in the present 
regression. In other words, desired innovation offset due to prevention investment that 
can exceed the compliance cost requires longer period than three years at least. It is not 
very far from expectation due to the character of this type of investment. On the other 
hand, the effect of treatment investment can be seen with one-year lag. Therefore, there is 
more motivation to invest in treatment technologies for firms compared to prevention 
technologies. It seems that investment in prevention technology due to its time-
consuming and required massive financial resources is not a persuading task to be 
fulfilled by all firms.              
 
Overall, the lack of richness of the data has not allowed me to assess the empirical 
validity of the concerned Hypothesis very significantly. The concern of this thesis was to 
present the approach. Here, there are some suggestions for the future empirical works 
with access to the data with longer period and more facilities: 
 
• In this thesis, five sectors in industry were included. Having more sectors can 
improve the results. 
• Controlling the sample for each sector can release the proportion of each type of 
investments in sectors. For example, it may be seen that prevention investment is 
more focused in gas and oil sector compared to chemical activities. 
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• In estimation of profit index, the net profit acquired from different types of 
investment can provide results that are more valid. As I discussed earlier, 
increasing in profit may occur due to different sources. The desired index should 
reflect just the increase in profit caused by different kinds of environmental 
investments. 
 
As the presented work is the first step in investigating the effect of different 
environmental protection investments on financial performance in Norwegian industrial 
sections, there is a significant potential of improvement and research works in future. 
Finding a significant positive relationship between the treatment investment and profit 
index is a promising point that the future works with more efficient data can achieve 
results that are more valid.  
 
According to the result, the answer to the title question Prevention or Treatment 
Environmental Innovation, ‘Which one Pays to be Green?’ is a positive support for 
treatment environmental technology. Similar to the previous results in this field, still the 
answer to the important question of when and for whom each investment should be 
applied is ambiguous. 
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